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IDENTIFICATION HIERARCHIES OF INHABITANTS OF AUSTRIAN GALICIA IN THE LOCAL DIMENSION*

Abstract

In the first place, the main identifications of residents of Austrian Galicia in the period between 1772 and 1918 are discussed; emphasised is the fact that diverse individual hierarchies of identification could be formed. Then, it is shown in what ways these identification directions surfaced in the specified local dimension – namely, in the town of Drohobycz (today Ukrainian Drohobych), in the specific historical moment – that is, during the 1911 election for the Vienna Parliament. On this occasion, the local elite carried out the election of their own candidate, contrary to what the majority of local dwellers demanded – which resulted in protest actions and unusual alliances between the locals. Given the exemplary occurrence with its limited place and time framework, the article seeks to analyse the sympathies and antipathies among the Galicians, which tended at times to be astonishing and not necessarily followed the lines of ethnic/national and political divisions. The argument has it that what was happening tended to be contrary to the image of the conflict that split the province's three main ethnic groups, on the one hand, and the vision of a concordant coexistence between Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews, on the other.

Keywords: (Austrian) Galicia, Drohobycz, identification hierarchy, parliamentary election, locality

I INTRODUCTION

Several books have been written, enough to make up a voluminous library, on the complicated relationships between the ethnic groups within Austrian Galicia, formerly a part of the Polish-Lithuanian

* This article has been written thanks to the grant ref. no. 2018/31/D/HS2/00356, funded by the National Science Centre [NCN].

Commonwealth. The images of these relation(ship)s – be it historiographic, popularising, or literary – rank between two extremes. On the one hand, there are visions of acute ethnic or nationality-based conflicts turning into parliamentary obstructionism, street riots, economic boycott and political assassinations, which reportedly proved the Habsburg monarchy's inability to manage a multinational society. Such concepts related to the issue in question first appeared in the nineteenth century and were solidified in the subsequent century with a prevalent contribution of Oszkár Jászi, a Hungarian historian and politician, in his widely-read work *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*¹ of 1929. On the other hand, we have got images of a bucolical coexistence of various nations or ethnic groups and religious denominations, forming a beautiful cultural melting pot. Such an idealisation initially stemmed from the Galician myth, a much literary entity which was derived from the Habsburg myth,² and which evolved into at least four variants – Austrian, Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish.³ Both ways of demonstrating the national relations in Galicia – the one emphasising disputes and the one blurring them – are major simplifications. Between these extremes lies a multifaceted, multi-aspect, and fascinatingly (or overwhelmingly) ambivalent image of Poles, Ukrainians, Jews, as well as members of the other nations living together, next to each other and apart – in Galicia as well as across the monarchy. This article attempts at rendering this image more detailed and specific, while it upfront quits the idea to show the image's multiple aspects – this being a task to be potentially dealt with in a number of books, rather than in a single essay. Instead of reconstructing details of complementary approaches and distant existence of Galician ethnic/national groups, I will focus in the first place on the main directions of identification of the province's residents between the years 1772 and 1918, pointing to the fact that they could have created diverse individual hierarchies. I will then show how these identification directions surfaced in a local

¹ Oszkár Jászi, *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1929).

² See Claudio Magris, *Der habsburgische Mythos in der modernen österreichischen Literatur*, trans. Madeleine von Pásztor (Salzburg, 1966).

³ See e.g. Emil Brix, 'Galicia as an "Austrian" Myth', Waldemar Łazuga, 'Galicia as a "Polish" Myth', Jarosław Hrycak, 'Galicia as a "Ukrainian" Myth', Larry Wolff, 'Galician Jews. Imperial Myths and Provincial Identities', in Jacek Purchla, Wolfgang Kos, Żanna Komar, Monika Rydiger, and Werner M. Schwarz (eds), *The Myth of Galicia* (Wien-Kraków, 2014).

dimension and at a specified historical moment – namely, in the town of Drohobycz, at the time of the Vienna Parliament election of 1911. I am aware of the fact that the local dimension and the particular moment that fostered the exacerbation of socio-political tensions creates no basis for generalisation – and generalising is not what I seek at all. On the contrary, using the example of a limited place and time, I should like to demonstrate that the sympathies and antipathies of Galicia's people proved at times to be astonishing, not necessarily following the lines of ethnic/national and political divisions. In other words, that they clearly opposed the image of the conflict that split the province's three ethnic/national groups, and the vision of concordant coexistence between Poles, Ukrainians and Jews; and that they at times went in a way that makes the popular convictions about the Galicians' affiliations highly complicated.

II HIERARCHIES OF IDENTIFICATION OF GALICIA'S INHABITANTS

According to the convincing argument put forth independently by two sociologists, Zbigniew Pucek and Jerzy Chłopecki,⁴ the basic and primary directions of the Galicians' identification were set by bonds with local communities. These bonds were durable, as was the traditional local context of existence that extended to the original group and the natural, material and symbolic realities of the local environment. Their key significance had a number of reasons in Galicia, two of which, at least, need to be specified. Firstly, these realities were inherited from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and thus preceded the emergence of the province in question. Secondly, although the nineteenth-century vision of Galician backwardness, or even barbarism, resulted from asymmetric comparisons with the imagined West,⁵ Galicia – when compared, for instance, to Lower Austria, Bohemia, or Moravia – was a region of backward civilisation, low spatial and

⁴ Zbigniew Pucek, 'Galicyjskie doświadczenie wielokulturowości a problem więzi społecznej', in Jerzy Chłopecki and Helena Madurowicz-Urbańska (eds), *Spółczesność i gospodarka. Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, ii (Rzeszów, 1995); Chłopecki, 'Galicja – skrzyżowanie dróg', in *ibid.*

⁵ See Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994).

social mobility, small contribution of locals to the functioning of public institutions, with high illiteracy on top of it all. These and other such limitations caused that the people would rather rarely cross the barriers of homeliness and localness, usually sticking to their local communities. Entering the path of modernisation change, which irregularly and unevenly occurred in diverse areas of the monarchy,⁶ and the development of new identifications resulted in a weakening of the links between individuals and their local community. One has to agree with Pucek and Chłopecki that at least until 1918 these links and associations formed the foreground dimension of the experience for the absolute majority of the region's inhabitants.

The other identification dimension consisted in the Galicians' identification with the province they dwelled in. This particular issue is addressed in, among others, the studies by Larry Wolff⁷ and Iryna Vushko.⁸ According to these historians, resulting from the policies pursued by Vienna, consisting in granting concessions to various ethnic/national groups and balancing on, or blurring, the borderline between the national, the provincial, and the imperial, the concept of citizenship developed, based on one's bond with the region, rather than a linguistic, religious, or ethnic/national affiliation and identification. The concept was associated with the latter mentioned type of affiliation since it had its Polish (Galicjanie), Ruthenian/Ukrainian (Halychany), and Jewish (Galitzianer) variety. However, it made the province – and, consequently, the ideology of power and the Habsburg empire – the framework for articulation of the Polish, Ruthenian/Ukrainian, or Jewish identification. Vushko thinks that the development of the identification that can be named a Galician identity was advanced in

⁶ Changes such as strengthening industrialisation, urbanisation, alphabetisation, specialisation of officials, internal migrations and mass involvement in public affairs in the Habsburg monarchy – taking account of the irregularity or inequality of these changes – are described in Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge–London, 2016), 218–68.

⁷ Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia. History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, 2010); *id.*, “Kennst du das Land?” The Uncertainty of Galicia in the Age of Metternich and Fredro’, *Slavic Review*, lxvii, 2 (2008), 277–300; *id.*, ‘Inventing Galicia: Messianic Josephinism and the Recasting of Partitioned Poland’, *Slavic Review*, lxiii, 4 (2004), 818–40.

⁸ Iryna Vushko, *The Politics of Cultural Retreat: Imperial Bureaucracy in Austrian Galicia 1772–1867* (New Haven–London, 2015).

as early as the 1830s.⁹ Wolff avoids defining any caesurae, arguing instead that the said identity was modelled, in a variety of ways, till the end of the province's existence within the confines of the Danube monarchy, and even outlived the collapse of it.

The third identification direction among Galicians was the imperial one. Thinking of state-wide identification among citizens of the Habsburg monarchy, Galicians included, is related to the reflection on the Empire as a whole. Such concepts were encouraged by the words of a Hungarian historian István Deák who provocatively stated that there were no dominant ethnicities or nationalities within the monarchy – instead, there were classes, interest groups, and institutions.¹⁰ The path set by Deák was followed by Austrian scholar Gerald Stourzh and his disciples – Emil Brix, Hannelore Burger, and Maria Kurz among them. One of the most recent dissertations within this particular historiographic current is a 2016 book by Pieter M. Judson.¹¹ On the one hand, this study demonstrates the influence of imperial institutions, administrative pragmatics and cultural policies in the Danube monarchy on the modelling of local and regional communities between the late eighteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. On the other, it shows the cooperation of local and regional communities with Habsburg authorities in the building of the Empire, the involvement of these communities in the actions and institutions that had a unifying effect on the countrywide level, along with taking advantage of the institutions for one's own purposes, within the same timeframe. The complicated process of building the monarchy gave its subjects, later on, citizens, a multiple shared experience that overcame the linguistic, religious/denominational and territorial divisions, resultantly created strong ties linking Central European peoples and existing in the local structures of the succession countries – most of the time, to a non-contentment of their respective authorities – even after the Great War.¹²

Another, fourth, direction of the Galician's identification was set by their association with the determined ethnic/national community – the aspect that finally prevailed over the other forms of identification of at

⁹ *Ibid.*, 159.

¹⁰ István Deák, 'Comments', *Austrian History Yearbook*, iii, 1 (1967), 303.

¹¹ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.

¹² *Ibid.*, 342.

least a part of the province's residents. In Galicia, this type of identification had three main variants – Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish, each having a rich bibliography.¹³ Considering the conflicting development of national movements in the region and their pressure on national identification among Poles, Ukrainians and Jews, one must bear in mind some ambivalences. First, these movements operated in the area of the Habsburg state, where the Nation and Empire constituted one another in conditions created for each other. Second, the political layers of antagonised national groups were sometimes capable of reaching agreements. Third, Galicia saw individuals of various nations or ethnicities who proved able to cooperate and collaborate. With all these circumstances, and over time, local Poles, Ukrainians and Jews increasingly yielded to nationalist sentiments and lived in progressive isolation – of choice rather than of necessity – not only in the political arena but also in the area of the apparently non-political everyday life. In his analysis of the emergence of civil society and the public sphere in the autonomous Galicia, Maciej Janowski aptly notes that they were prone to deepening division along the national borderlines.¹⁴ Opinions of those who identified the threats generated along these lines tended to quieten down amidst the nationalistic propaganda. In parallel, however – and now I am resuming the thread addressed by Judson – the political activity and the emotional bond focusing around the imperial institutions such as schools, universities, military barracks, transregional trade and more, put the nationalists' demands into a robust framework of structures and expectations created by the monarchy.¹⁵ Besides, as was the case with other regions of the Habsburg state, characteristic of a part of Galicia's society was national indifference – an attitude Gary B. Cohen¹⁶ described in relation to social dynamism of national affiliations in Prague;

¹³ Exemplary literature includes: Józef Buszko, *Galicja 1859–1914. Polski Piemont?* (Warszawa, 1989); Paul R. Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont* (Buffalo–Toronto, 2002); Joshua Shanes, *Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia* (New York, 2012).

¹⁴ Maciej Janowski, 'Galizien auf dem Weg zur Zivilgesellschaft', in Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch (eds), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, viii, 1: *Politische Öffentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft* (Wien, 2006), 805–58.

¹⁵ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 381–2.

¹⁶ Gary B. Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861–1914* (Princeton, 1981).

later on, it attracted the attention of some historians, Tara Zahra among them.¹⁷

Let us emphasise that the aforementioned forms of identification specific to Austrian Galicians – that is, local, regional (Galician), imperial, and national – did not function separately; instead, they entered various associations, colliding with one another at times and alternating with, or interpenetrating, one another some other time. With time and evolution of one's self-awareness, and with the broadening of one's horizons, a Galician individual's local identification could evolve into any of the other affiliations concerned. Regional identification had its national (or ethnic) variants while at the same time linking the individuals with the Habsburg empire. Imperial identification, in turn, entered into no contradiction with the Galician identity and had opportunities to merge with a national identity. At last, national identity was taking shape within the political, social, and cultural structures of the local circle, the region, and the Empire. To conceptualise this complex phenomenon, I suggest a reference to Paul R. Magocsi's idea expressed in his dissertation *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism* (2002), which addresses fluctuations in the identity of Ruthenian intelligentsia in the first half of the nineteenth century. Apparently, sometimes within a single lifetime, diverse identity-related phases and aspects appeared in sequence or in parallel, forming peculiar hierarchies of identity.¹⁸ Like Ruthenian intellectuals, Galicians could experience, and oftentimes did experience, a polymorphic or, following Magocsi's concept, hierarchical nature of their identifications. This means that their sense of identity was composed of diverse components – affiliations with local, regional, imperial, and national (ethnic) communities – which tended to merge into unstable constellations and, in certain situations, manifested themselves more or less intensely or faded away. Hereinbelow, taking the example of residents of Drohobycz who participated in the election for the Council of State in the year 1911, I will demonstrate how unexpectedly those individual, hierarchical and, in parallel, changeable constellations of associations with the local, the regional, the imperial, and/or the national were getting arranged in the given place and time. I will also show how they

¹⁷ Tara Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis', *Slavic Review*, lxi, 1 (2010), 93–119.

¹⁸ Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism*, 46.

disturbed the clear-cut picture of a conflict between the province's three ethnic/national groups, let alone the picture of a coexistence.

III A BLOODY ELECTION

On Tuesday, 13 June, and on Monday, 19 June 1911, over 4.5 million Austrian citizens (from over 5.6 million eligible to vote) turned out to establish a new parliament, by electing Council of State envoys. This election for the Vienna parliament marked no upheaval in the Austrian history: it came second after common and equal voting rights were instituted for men in 1907, and third after such rights were granted to males without property in 1897.¹⁹ Yet, huge emotion and interest were triggered across the state, and all this resulted in an eighty-plus per cent voter participation.²⁰

This was no different in Galicia.²¹ The fever of election canvassing and of the election itself was additionally stimulated by the fact that elections in the province were rather disreputable. Resulting from pressures and manipulations of officials and other influential figures, and with all those 'ballot-box miracles', candidates demanded by the authorities, rather than the locals, were quite often elected; hence, riots, including bloodshed, were not infrequent. Several participants of those events recollected them in their memoirs, as did chroniclers of their time – to name Ignacy Daszyński, Bolesław Drobner, or Wincenty Witos. The riots that broke out on the election day in Drohobycz –

¹⁹ The 1897 reform added to the four earlier-existing curiae electing the Austrian Council of State – i.e. great landownership, chambers of commerce, urban, and rural – one more, consisting of males aged twenty-four and over, regardless of income, with at least six-month residential record within the constituency. The reform of 1907 introduced common electoral law for men and abolished the curiae. See John W. Boyer, 'Power, Partisanship, and the Grid of Democratic Politics: 1907 as the Pivot Point of Modern Austrian History', *Austrian History Yearbook*, xlv (2013), 148–74; William Jenks, *The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907* (New York, 1974).

²⁰ See Dieter Nolen and Philip Stöver (eds), *Elections in Europe. A Data Handbook* (Baden-Baden, 2010), 196.

²¹ A contributory study of the 1911 election in Drohobycz was recently written by Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 2–4. Shanes mentions this election in the conclusions of his *Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia*, 279–80; his basic analysis focuses not on the riots during the election of 1911, though, but those which took place four years earlier, in 1907, across Galicia; *ibid.*, 197–277.

19 June 1911 – had fatal consequences, with twenty-six fatalities and over a hundred wounded, which led to their almost instantly coined nickname of ‘bloody election’. A number of reporters of these unrests – the press in Galicia as well as in other parts of Austria²² (and elsewhere)²³ reported on them over several subsequent days – emphasised that this unusual tragedy was brought about by extraordinary election-related abuses that took place in the town. “There is nothing accidental in the fact that blood has just been spilt in Drohobycz. After all, the threads of electoral swindling are kept there in the hands of the noted Feuerstein, the leader of the ‘*kutchyners*’ (‘crouches’) [a group of poorer workers, male and female], who **always went unpunished**”,²⁴ a Cracow-based newspaper *Naprzód* argued. This diagnosis seems apt. Some commentators, however, especially those who analysed the events in an in-depth manner, could identify their broader, not just local (though locally associated) context. Feliks Kon, a socialist (using the pseudonym ‘Bolesławski’), argued: “What happened in Drohobycz could have happened in any other Galician town, for the system was one-and-the-same across the space”. About the candidate pushed forward by the authorities, he wrote: “Dr. Loewenstein was not more fought in Drohobycz than any candidate appointed by the Government in any other place without coming to an agreement with the local people”.²⁵ Kon’s recognition was supported by the anonymous author of a pamphlet on the Drohobycz election, published in 1911,²⁶ and by Mściśław Mściwujewski, a historian of Drohobycz, active in the interwar period.²⁷ All of them have noticed that a general acquiescence

²² See e.g. Jehudo Epstein, ‘Der Schreckenstat in Drohobycz’, *Neue Freie Presse* (23 June 1911), 5; *id.*, ‘Die Vorfälle in Drohobycz’, *Neue Freie Presse* (24 June 1911), 6; ‘Die Vorfälle in Drohobycz’, *Neue Freie Presse* (25 June 1911), 6.

²³ See e.g. *Ungarländische Jüdische Zeitung* (23 June 1911), 1–2; *Jüdische Zeitung* (23 June 1911), 1–4; *Jüdische Zeitung* (30 June 1911), 1–3; *Jüdische Zeitung* (7 July 1911), 2–4; *Jüdische Zeitung* (14 July 1911), 4–5; *Die Welt* (23 June 1911), 1–4; *Die Welt* (30 June 1911), 3–4; *Kurjer* [of Lublin] (22 June 1911), 3.

²⁴ ‘Trupy drohobyckie. Urzędowa klasyfikacja zabitych. Skąd się biorą ekscendenci?’, *Naprzód* (22 June 1911), 1 [emphasis mine – J.W.].

²⁵ Feliks Bolesławski, *W obronie prawdy (tragedja drohobycka w świetle faktów)* (Lwów, 1911), 1, 2.

²⁶ See *Prawda o wyborach drohobyckich odbytych dnia 19 czerwca 1911 r.* (Lwów, 1911), 3.

²⁷ See Mściśław Mściwujewski, *Z dziejów Drohobycza*, Part 2 (Drohobycz, 1939), 185–6.

for election manipulations in Galicia had paved the way for particular abuse in the town. The date of 19 June in association with the locality of Drohobycz can, therefore, be conceptualised as a chronotope which brings to the foreground the basic election habits prevalent in the province at the time and in which the local responses to these habits are reflected, like through a prism.

In the late first decade of the twentieth century, Drohobycz was not a large town: among its population of 35,000, there were 15,500 Jews, 12,000 Poles, and 7,500 Ukrainians.²⁸ It was, however, one of the wealthiest towns in Galicia, with only Lwów and Cracow taking the upper hand. This was related to the crude oil and mineral wax mining, and to the development of the industries based upon these materials in the Bolesławiec-Drohobycz Oil Field.²⁹ The record-breaking year 1909 saw a total of 200,000 cisterns with oil exported from the Drohobycz railway station, with the oil mining output of two million tonnes.³⁰ The oil boom contributed to the town's development, along with a polarisation of the local society. A group of the boom beneficiaries emerged, called 'the oil barons', increasingly affluent and exclusive, with the concentration of the mines in the hands of great companies – a process that progressed since the early 1880s.³¹ The opposite pole was occupied by a majority of the town's dwellers who represented three main Galician ethnicities/nationalities and belonged to the middle or the lower social class. These people drew slim profits, or no profit at all, from the mining and processing of the 'black gold'.

In 1911, a number of the town's dwellers, particularly the Jews affiliated to Zionism, less affluent exponents of Polish bourgeoisie, and Ukrainians, expressed their legitimate concern that the local authorities – impersonated by Kazimierz Piątkiewicz, the *Starosta*,

²⁸ See Mieczysław Orłowicz, *Ilustrowany przewodnik po Galicyi, Bukowinie, Orawie i Śląsku Cieszyńskim* (Lwów, 1919), 248.

²⁹ See Alison Fleig Frank, *Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge–London, 2005).

³⁰ See Stanisław S. Niciejka, *Kresowe Trójmiasto. Truskawiec – Drohobycz – Bolesław* (Opole, 2009), 69; *id.*, 'Drohobycz', *Strony. Opolskie pismo społeczno-kulturalne*, i–ii (2009), 277.

³¹ This phenomenon is analysed by Władysława Moskalets, 'Analiza sieci przedsiębiorstw naftowych w roku 1906: rola przedsiębiorców żydowskich w rozwoju zagłębia borysławsko-drohobyckiego', in Jacek Kurczewski, Dariusz Wojakowski, and Leonid Tymoszenko (eds), *O Drohobyczu, trójmieście i zagłębiu. Polsko-ukraińskie studia z socjologii historycznej* (Rzeszów, 2016), 107–15.

and his report Commissioner Stanisław Łyszkowski – would bring about the election of Natan Loewenstein as member of the Council of State. A Jewish lawyer and barrister at Drohobycz, Loewenstein first became a deputy in 1907 but was not at all concerned about the local voters' interests, in the opinion of most of them. Four years later, he still enjoyed support from the Polish Circle, of which he was a member; he was moreover supported by Michał Bobrzyński, the then-Governor-General of Galicia, who was associated with the Circle as well. But above all, he could count on the locally most influential family of Feuerstein, with their leader Jakub Feuerstein at the forefront. This Jewish family was related – through Jakub, who had married Adele Gartenberg, daughter of Lazar Gartenberg – to one of the most well-off industrialists in the Oil Field. Their authority in the town was so influential that they could unrestrainedly decide how to fill local administrative and judiciary positions and had a decisive say about the local political and economic realities. In Mściwujewski's words, "even the Austrian Government and the autonomous authorities regarded Drohobycz as a domain of the Feuersteins, of sorts".³² The family returned the favour of "free rein" in the town – as Ernest Breiter, a Council-of-State deputy from Lwów (elected in 1911), author of the oration *Mord w Drohobyczu* [A slaughter in Drohobycz] from the same year,³³ put it – by supporting candidates for various authorities, primarily the Council of State and the Land Diet [Polish, *Sejm Krajowy*].

The threat that Jakub Feuerstein could bring in 1911 about Loewenstein's re-election, using Piątkiewicz and Łyszkowski for the purpose, caused anti-Feuerstein elements in Drohobycz to be brought together. The anonymous author of *Prawda o wyborach drohobyckich* [The truth about the Drohobycz election] wrote thus: "Zionists, socialists, Polish townspeople and artisans", and the Ukrainians (called by him 'Ruthenians') – "all these formations and parties, with their contradicting interests and views, and disparate objectives, have always marched together about the local policy summarised in the programme: 'Down with Feuerstein, the economy and the man!', forgetting, under the force of the whip, about the struggle that was seething betwixt them

³² Mściwujewski, *Z dziejów Drohobycza*, 185.

³³ Excerpts from Ernest Reiter's oration *Mord drohobycki*, delivered before the Court of the Vienna Parliament on 26 July 1911 and published later on that year, are quoted in Mściwujewski, see *ibid.*, 185, 191, here 185.

in the other towns of Galicia”.³⁴ The ‘always’ remark was certainly exaggerated, but the author can be trusted about the fact that the said forces, having put forward their candidates in 1911 (incl. Zionists led by Gerszon Zipper; Mateusz M. Balicki’s “independent bourgeoisie and progressive Polish element”; and Włodzimierz Kobryn’s Ukrainians),³⁵ endeavoured to canvass for them – not against one another but against Loewenstein. Probably any of the oppositional candidates seemed better to them than the favourite of the town’s Jewish elite and Polish conservative circles, which exercised efficient rule over Galicia. All the more so that the threat that Loewenstein might win again was growing. Jakub Feuerstein openly heralded his success and, to avoid a surprise, falsified the election ticket: with a diminished number of Loewenstein’s opponents, he put on the list almost 1,400 names, most of whom were defunct, disenfranchised criminals, women and children without the right to vote, and remotely-former residents of Drohobycz; in addition, he paralysed the claims process. In light of overt pre-election frauds, the deputation of opposition parties, with the Zionists in the lead, notified the Galician General-Governorate, the Prime Minister of Austria (Richard Bienenrth was in office till 28 June 1911) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (run, as part of Bienenrth’s Cabinet, by Guido Haerdtl and Maximilian Wickenburg). Then, to ensure the efficiency of the intervention, the deputation visited the General-Governor’s palace (nicknamed ‘the Jackdaws Palace’). Scoffed at, the team sought support in Vienna, three days before the election. Section Counsellor Richard Wenedigter, the Interior Ministry’s clerk for Galicia’s electoral affairs, ensured the disturbed delegates from Drohobycz that, following the previous telegraphic complaint submitted by opposition parties, the Ministry ordered the General-Governorate to call the *Starosta* of Drohobycz to forthwith correct the ticket and to strictly follow the laws and statutes.³⁶ Thus, a state-wide institution recognised a complaint from the Drohobycz opposition as legitimate, and intervened. The country (land) institution turned out to be consensually or, more plausibly, deliberately ignorant.

³⁴ *Prawda o wyborach drohobyckich*, 5.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁶ For more on the Drohobycz opposition’s intervention, see *Prawda o wyborach drohobyckich*, 16–17; Bolesławski, *W obronie prawdy*, 4–6; Mściwujewski, *Z dziejów Drohobycza*, 186.

As F. Kon wrote, “those at the Jackdaws did not know, or perhaps did not want to know, that the County [*powiat*] of Drohobycz was abuzz like a cauldron”.³⁷ The local institution, probably instigated by Jakub Feuerstein, ignored the ministerial directive and started to deliver the command for correcting the ticket dated 18 June on the day following the election day, i.e. 20 June.

The consequences of these collusions and irregularities on the election day in Drohobycz turned out to be fatal. The interest in the election among the locals was enormous, like almost everywhere else in Austria; it was not limited to the 8,000 eligible voters but extended to women, the underage, and visitors. Forming a mass of multiple thousand, the locals swarmed since five o'clock in the morning – as the authorities set the voting time from 5:00 a.m. to 17:00 p.m. – in front of the only polling station made available for the purpose, in Stryjska St., the town's busiest street; the road traffic was not halted to facilitate the procedure. The station was surrounded and guarded by soldiers with bayonets; evident followers of Loewenstein and substitutes sent by Jakub Feuerstein, who were to vote his favourite man, some of them repeatedly, were let in. The access was restricted to a minimum for the others, primarily the opposition sympathisers. What is more, in a forty-six-metre distance from the polling station, a Loewenstein canvassing station was situated on the consent of the *Starosta* Office – although an earlier edict of this authority banned canvassing activity within the radius of 100 metres from the voting spot; identity cards and ballot papers were forged at this canvassing station. An increasingly dishevelled crowd of those who waited in vain for their turn to cast a vote and started throwing stones at the canvassing station, and then the Jewish religious community residence and Jakub Feuerstein's house, were several times chased away from the area around the polling station by a mounted troop.

After the lunch break, which in Galicia at the election time was sarcastically nicknamed ‘the hour of ghosts’, a few youngsters threw broken chairs out of the canvassing station, which triggered the decision to open fire. Sixty men of the 9th Infantry Regiment of Stryj and forty from the 40th Infantry Regiment from Rzeszów, supported by mounted soldiers, went into attack the crowd. The soldiers fired ninety-four shots altogether. On the subsequent several days, the Galician press

³⁷ Bolesławski, *W obronie prawdy*, 4.

gave increasing numbers of fatalities reportedly fallen in Drohobycz: eight,³⁸ thirteen;³⁹ finally, the count stopped at twenty-six killed. The official statistics spoke of forty-seven wounded; Mściwujewski stated that there were over a hundred injured with many never admitting they were harmed because of fear of being instantly accused by the public prosecutor's office of a 'crime of public violation'.⁴⁰ Who passed the order to fire the guns? Some maintained that no-one actually did, it was the soldiers who opened fire; Kon bitterly mocked at this version, considering it improbable.⁴¹ The morning daily *Kurjer Lwowski*, clearly repeating what its editors had heard from the town's rulers, claimed: "It is certain that Commissioner Łys[z]kowski and the civil authorities endeavoured, on their part, to render the commanding officer [Lieutenant Hüttl, commander of the law-enforcement services – J.W.] aware of the consequences of his conduct, and beseeched him that he made no use of the fire-arms. To no avail, though. The salvo was fired".⁴² However, it was the anonymous pamphleteer and Feliks Kon that were right as they believed that both Łyszkowski and Hüttl contributed to the disastrous decision.⁴³ And Mściwujewski was probably right, too, in his conviction that the fusillade would not have been possible unless commanded by Jakub Feuerstein, the real ruler of Drohobycz.⁴⁴ In contrast to what *Kurjer Lwowski* wrote, there was another sure thing: there were aged men, women and children, as well as casual people among the victims – one of them being "a girl aged eighteen" who "carried her wedding dress from a tailor's".⁴⁵ Some were stabbed to death with bayonets – like the Ukrainian artisan Dmytro Tatarsky who protested against the people being shot at.⁴⁶ Most of the victims were killed or wounded by shooting at their backs,⁴⁷ which attests that those fleeing were aimed at as well.

³⁸ See e.g. 'Krwawe wybory w Drohobyczcu', *Nowa Reforma* (20 June 1911), 1.

³⁹ See e.g. 'Trupy przy wyborach', *Kurjer Lwowski* (20 June 1911), 1; 'Krwawe wybory w Drohobyczcu. 13 zabitych – 67 ciężko rannych', *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* (21 June 1911), 5.

⁴⁰ Mściwujewski, *Z dziejów Drohobycza*, 190.

⁴¹ Bolesławski, *W obronie prawdy*, 14.

⁴² 'Krwawe wybory w Drohobyczcu', *Kurjer Lwowski* (21 June 1911), 1.

⁴³ *Prawda o wyborach drohobyckich*, 33.

⁴⁴ Mściwujewski, *Z dziejów Drohobycza*, 190, 191.

⁴⁵ *Prawda o wyborach drohobyckich*, 34.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴⁷ Mściwujewski, *Z dziejów Drohobycza*, 190.

The election procedure went uninterrupted in spite of the massacre. Finally, as Jakub Feuerstein, the General-Governorate and the Polish Circle could expect, Loewenstein won the election. Albeit Daszyński and Herman Diamand forced him to resign, he won again through a by-election. The Drohobycz opposition and, together with it, most of the Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian locals, eventually lost the battle.

What does this tragic incident demonstrate? First of all, it shows the extent of iniquities and manifestations of force that a local elite of the Habsburg monarchy proved to be capable of in their strife for maintaining power in the face of proactive opposition and mass-scale mobilisation of voters. This was noticed by several commentators, at the time and later on – for instance, Breiter (supported some time afterwards by Mściwujewski), who opined that the massacre was caused by “the will on the part of the Feuerstein clique, and the imperial- and-royal authority standing at their service, to show the crowd what these two powers actually meant in Drohobycz, and what they were up to”.⁴⁸ The incident moreover revealed what were the hierarchies of identification for a significant number of Drohobycz residents at the time and place concerned. In this town, localism was so important, and still primary dimension in the life of multiethnic and socially diverse masses of dwellers that – with a vague chance for success – they resolved to fight for altering the locally prevalent power relations and oppose their most severe oppressors they had encountered in the local context. It would perhaps seem that the locals should have resorted to the institutions of Galicia as the basic instances, since identification with the province was – for the lion’s share of those people – certainly more robust than affiliation with Austria as a whole. The Land Diet gathering in Lwów had a stronger influence on their daily lives than the central, Vienna-based Parliament. Since they did not confine themselves to such a move, or even deemed it inefficient, it was so primarily for the reason that has already been identified. To a certain extent at least, some of the locals – mainly the elite of the local opposition – realised that the General-Governorate found it convenient to have a deputy elected who would be associated with affluent Jewish industrialists as well as Polish conservatives, though the former ones traditionally rivalled in the economic field against Polish industrial milieus in Galicia. Secondly, the electoral rules for the Land

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 191.

Diet were definitely more restrictive compared to that binding since 1907 for the Council-of-State election, thus offering a smaller chance to elect a deputy that would really represent the local community and its interests.⁴⁹ For these reasons, Drohobycz voters resolved to make use of the electoral law ensured for them on the state-wide level, so that the Empire – basically, its imperial institutions – could be used to exert at least a slight influence on those who, as they believed, marginalised them or even made them harm in the local dimension. The participation of Drohobycz residents in the 19 June 1911 election was numerous, both in terms of active participation of those eligible to vote and willing to cast their vote and the assisting participation of those who were not allowed to vote but were not indifferent to the outcome. This fact proves that the election for the Vienna Parliament was important for broad masses of newly-minted voters as well as for the other locals. What it also indicates is that Austro-Hungarian citizens, the Galicians in general, and residents of Drohobycz in particular, sensed (at least at moments as particular as parliamentary election) that in their influence on what the state would be like, they could shape their own fortunes or fates as well. They clearly saw a link between the two aspects and could identify themselves with the Empire as a whole, even though they basically dwelled in a small faraway provincial town.

The course of election campaigns, which in Drohobycz were run by Zionist Jews, along with Poles and Ukrainians, and mainly aimed against Loewenstein, proves that in the local dimension cooperation of political parties united against a common enemy was possible in Galicia. The rebellion of linguistically, religiously and ethnically/nationally diverse people in front of the polling station on 19 June 1911 clearly demonstrates that such cooperation did not extend to elites only. The development of Polish and Ukrainian national movements in the province, permeated with conflicts, and, especially, the increasingly stronger anti-Semitic accents in both movements,⁵⁰ caused that the

⁴⁹ Most of the Land Diet deputies were elected under the curial system, the remainder being virilists sitting on the Diet during their term with offices giving them parliamentary rights; see Stanisław Grodziski, *Sejm Krajowy galicyjski 1861–1914* (Warszawa, 1993).

⁵⁰ See, for example, Keely Stauter-Halstead, 'Jews as Middlemen Minorities in Rural Poland: Understanding the Galician Pogroms of 1898', in Robert Blobaum (ed.), *Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland* (London, 2005), 39–59; Peter

alliance of the Zionists, Polish and Ukrainian bourgeoisie, and Ukrainian peasantry seemed difficult to imagine in Galicia. However, once the Drohobycz inhabitants representing all these groups desperately wanted to see their favourite candidate as an envoy and stormed toward the polling station, threw stones at the canvassing station and then wept over the massacre's victims, the 'impossible' became a reality. This alliance was, to a certain extent, reflected in the lists of the killed and the wounded, quoting their full names regardless of nationality.⁵¹ Mściwujewski could sense the spirit of this alliance as he heralded: "Out of this innocently spilt blood avengers shall emerge, not divided according to descent or confession but united toward one goal of growing liberated from a murderous system and winning true liberty, and equality in rights!"⁵² Even if those 'avengers' of Drohobycz were defeated in 1911, and their cooperation was incidental rather than regular, the 'bloody election' – with the untypical hierarchies of identification they generated among their actors – nuance the traditional convictions about the Habsburg monarchy's fuelling ethnic or national and religious (confessional) disputes, and about the national relations in Galicia.

IV CONCLUSIONS

Let me repeat that based on the history of the fatal election in Drohobycz in the year 1911 one can draw no general conclusion about the identification hierarchies among inhabitants of Austrian Galicia on the local level. Presumptions are quite legitimate, though, as to what these hierarchies might have been like under specified circumstances. Among the latter, I would point to the conditions and determinants appearing in each of the main dimensions of semi-public and public life the Galicians could feel associated with. In the local context, these included conflicts not only along the lines of language, confessional, and ethnic/national cleavages but between interest groups. Again, on the regional – that is, Galician – level, country

J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (eds), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1990).

⁵¹ See, e.g., *Prawda o wyborach drohobyckich*, 35–8.

⁵² Mściwujewski, *Z dziejów Drohobycza*, 191.

(land) institutions favoured certain interest groups at the expense of the others. Further on, as to the state-wide context, there were laws in place, and institutions guarding them, that provided the citizens with a battleground for their own political, social, and cultural vision of the local centre and/or province. On the national level, a situation emerged where the nation- and state-building objectives which were increasingly overwhelming for Galicians became gradually dominated by more extemporaneous social goals, seen as really important at the given moment.

Given these circumstances, the identification hierarchies among the dwellers of a specified local centre in Galicia did not necessarily correspond with the image of ethnic/national clashes and the vision of coexistence of nations. Moreover, they might have stood in opposition to the system of associations or bonds between the Habsburg monarchy's citizens, which some historians approach as evident: the bond with the local, then with the regional, and finally with things imperial, but most of all, and primarily, with what was national. In the circumstances discussed above, the identifications traditionally regarded as secondary (notably, the imperial identification) could have well taken the upper hand over those perceived as the priority ones (primarily national, but also regional). In 1911, a vast majority of residents of Drohobycz tended to identify themselves with the local circle of their lives; yet, it was within this circle that they experienced oppression and injustice. Their Galician identity was, most probably, more robust than their imperial affiliation, but at the peculiar moment of election for the Council of State, which gave an opportunity for a change in the local political arrangement, the identification with the Austrian state and its institutions advanced significantly. In the eyes of many, the state and the institutions formed an alternative force, real and symbolic, which perhaps did not prevail over the power of the local elite, but at least debilitated it – more efficiently than the administrative and political emanations of the province, associated with that elite, could do. Hence, in the pre-election time and during the election, so many inhabitants of Drohobycz got involved in the matters of their localism – which also meant the affairs of the Habsburg monarchy; not only the well-to-do and the politically active were among those committed actors. Hence, on the critical day of 19 June, they all got unified against the Feuersteins and the local decision-makers, regardless of what language they spoke in their daily lives, what temple or church

they frequented, and what national idea they supported – be it Jewish, Polish, or Ukrainian. Believing that they were fighting for a better tomorrow for their local community, they would perhaps have been ready to support one common candidate – be it Zipper, the Zionist, who was the most popular opponent of Loewenstein – and do anything else to prevent the favourite of the local power brokers from getting into the Parliament in Vienna as a representative of their hometown.

There is probably no chronotope that could better reveal those labile identification hierarchies of the Galicians – the hierarchies that, once revisited, induce one to reconsider the issue of the identity of members/exponents of the group in question – than a given local dimension or level, grasped at a determined (preferably, extraordinary) historical moment.

trans. *Tristan Korecki*

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